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This paper provides a game-theoretic model of a professional sports league and analyzes
the effect of luxury taxes on competitive balance, club profits and social welfare. We show that a
luxury tax increases aggregate salary payments in the league as well as produces a more balanced
league. Moreover, a higher tax rate increases the profits of large-market clubs, whereas the
profits of small-market clubs only increase if the tax rate is not set inadequately high. Finally, we
show that social welfare increases with a luxury tax.
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Zurich.1 Introduction
A "luxury tax," or competitive balance tax, is a surcharge on the aggregate pay-
roll of a sports team that exceeds a predetermined limit set by the corresponding
sports league. The luxury tax was essentially designed to slow the growth of
salaries and to prevent large-market teams from signing all of the top players
within a league. The money derived from this tax is distributed among the ￿-
nancially weaker teams. The luxury tax thus aims to create a more balanced
league, because redistribution among clubs counteracts ￿nancial imbalances.
In North America, the National Basketball Association (NBA) and Major
League Baseball (MLB) operate with a luxury tax system. In 1984, the NBA
became the ￿rst league to introduce salary cap provisions.1 The NBA￿ s salary
cap is a so-called "soft cap", meaning that there are several exceptions that allow
teams to exceed the salary cap in order to sign players. These exceptions are
mainly designed to enable teams to retain popular players. In 1999, the NBA
also introduced a luxury tax system for those teams with an average team payroll
exceeding the salary cap by a prede￿ned amount. These teams have to pay a
100% tax to the league for each dollar their payroll exceeds the tax level.
The ￿rst luxury tax in professional sports was introduced in 1996 by MLB
as part of its Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). This agreement imposed
a luxury tax of 35% for the ￿rst two years and 34% for the third year on the
teams with the top ￿ve payrolls during the 1997, 1998 and 1999 seasons. Between
2000 and 2002, the luxury tax system was replaced by a revenue-sharing system.
MLB reintroduced a luxury tax system in 2003 and set ￿xed limits on payrolls
for every year. For instance, the limit was $137 million in 2006, $148 million in
2007 and $155 million in 2008. The excess payroll is taxed at 22.5% for ￿rst-time
1A salary cap is a limit on the amount of money a club can spend on player salaries. The cap
is usually de￿ned as a percentage of average annual revenues and limits a club￿ s investment in
playing talent. For a more detailed analysis, see e.g., Fort and Quirk (1995), KØsenne (2000a),
Szymanski (2003) and Vrooman (1995, 2000).
2o⁄enders, 30% for the second o⁄ence and 40% for three or more o⁄ences.
The following table shows recent luxury tax payments in the NBA and MLB:
Luxury Tax Payments (in US $)
League Club Season 2006-07 Season 2007-08
NBA New York Knicks 45￿ 100￿ 000 19￿ 700￿ 000
Dalas Mavericks 7￿ 200￿ 000 19￿ 600￿ 000
Cleveland Cavaliers - 14￿ 000￿ 000
Denver Nuggets 2￿ 000￿ 000 13￿ 600￿ 000
Miami Heat - 8￿ 300￿ 000
Boston Celtics - 8￿ 200￿ 000
Minnesota Timberwolves 1￿ 000￿ 000 -
LA Lakers - 5￿ 100￿ 000
Phoenix Suns - 3￿ 900￿ 000
San Antonio Spurs 200￿ 000 -
League Club Season 2006 Season 2007
MLB New York Yankees 26￿ 000￿ 000 23￿ 880￿ 000
Boston Red Soxs 498￿ 000 6￿ 060￿ 000
This paper provides a game-theoretic model with respect to a professional
team sports league in order to analyze the e⁄ect of luxury taxes on competitive
balance, club pro￿ts and social welfare. We show that a luxury tax increases
aggregate salary payments in the league as well as produces a more balanced
league. Moreover, a higher tax rate increases the pro￿ts of large-market clubs,
whereas the pro￿ts of small-market clubs only increase if the tax rate is not set
inadequately high. Finally, we show that social welfare increases with a luxury
tax.
The e⁄ect of luxury taxes on social welfare has not yet been studied in the
sports economic literature. There are, however, some studies that analyze the
e⁄ect of luxury taxes on competitive balance and player salaries. Based on a dual
3supply and demand model for star and regular players, Gustafson and Hadley
(1996) ￿nd that a luxury tax will depress the demand curve for star players
on high-payroll teams and will not alter the demand for star players by low-
payroll teams. The result is a lower equilibrium salary for star players. The new
equilibrium is characterized by a higher level of competitive balance, because the
high-payroll teams will hire fewer star players and the low-payroll teams will hire
more star players as compared to the period prior the introduction of the luxury
tax.
Marburger (1997) develops a model with two pro￿t-maximizing clubs, includ-
ing one large-market club and one small-market club, and a ￿xed talent supply.
He shows that luxury taxes that are uniformly imposed as a linear function of
a club￿ s payroll and that are not redistributed to other clubs do not a⁄ect club
pro￿tability because the decline in salaries equals the increase in taxes. Luxury
taxes that are redistributed according to a linear subsidy function result in lower
salaries and higher pro￿ts, but they do not a⁄ect competitive balance. In order
to reward small-market clubs and improve competitive balance, the proceeds of
luxury taxes must be distributed uniformly among all clubs.
Ajilore and Hendrickson (2005) analyze the e⁄ect of luxury taxes on compet-
itive balance in MLB by empirically estimating the impact of luxury taxes on
team competitiveness. Their results show that the introduction of a luxury tax
in MLB has reduced the competitive inequality of teams. However, most of their
results are driven by a single team, the New York Yankees.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
the model￿ s framework, including its underlying assumptions, and discusses the
results. Section 3 concludes.
42 Model
The following model describes the impact of luxury taxes on social welfare in a
professional team sports league consisting of an even number of pro￿t-maximizing
clubs. The league generates total revenues according to a league demand func-
tion. League revenues are then split among the clubs that di⁄er with respect to
their bargaining power. We assume that there are two types of clubs, namely,
large-market clubs with strong bargaining power and small-market clubs with
weak bargaining power. In order to maximize pro￿ts, each club independently
invests in playing talent. Note that we regard the salary payment of each club
as an investment in talent.2
League demand depends on the quality of the league q and is derived as
follows.3 We assume a continuum of fans who di⁄er in their willingness to pay
for a league with quality q. Every fan k has a certain preference for quality
that is measured by ￿k. The fans ￿k are assumed to be uniformly distributed
in [0;1], i.e. the measure of potential fans is one. The net utility of fan ￿k
is speci￿ed as maxf￿kq ￿ p;0g. At price p, the fan that is indi⁄erent between
consuming the league product or not is given by ￿
￿ =
p
q. Hence, the measure of
fans that purchase at price p is 1 ￿ ￿
￿ =
q￿p
q . The league demand function is
therefore given by d(p;q) := 1￿
p
q. Note that league demand increases in quality,
albeit with a decreasing rate; that is, @d
@q > 0 and @2d
@q2 < 0. By normalizing
all other costs (e.g., stadium and broadcasting costs) to zero, league revenue is
simply LR = p￿d(p;q). Then, the league will choose the pro￿t-maximizing price
2In the subsequent analysis, we use the terms "salary payments" and "talent investments"
interchangeably.
3Our approach is similar to Falconieri et al. (2004), but we use a di⁄erent quality function.
The quality function q in Falconieri et al. (2004) always increases with a club￿ s own talent
investments, i.e.,
@q
@xi > 0, regardless of how unbalanced the league becomes. In contrast, in
our model, quality decreases if the league becomes too unbalanced. Also see Dietl and Lang
(2008), Dietl, Lang and Rathke (2009) and Dietl, Lang and Werner (2009)
5p￿ =
q
2.4 Given this pro￿t-maximizing price, league revenue depends solely on





Following the sports economic literature (e.g. Szymanski, 2003), we assume that
league quality depends on the level of the competition as well as the potential
suspense associated with a close competition (i.e., competitive balance).
The level of competition is measured by the aggregate talent within the n-
club league. We assume that the marginal e⁄ect of the salary payment, denoted











This is guaranteed in our model if @T
@xi > 0 ,
Pn
j=1 xj < ￿
2 and @2T
@x2
i < 0, which
will always be satis￿ed in equilibrium.














Note that a lower variance of salary payments among the n clubs implies closer
competition and, therefore, a higher degree of competitive balance. If all clubs
invest the same amount in talent, then the measure for competitive balance
attains its maximum and equals zero.




5For an analysis of competitive balance in sports leagues, see e.g., Humphreys (2002),
Buraimo et al. (2007) and Buraimo and Simmons (2008). Moreover, see Frick et al. (2003)
who investigate the consequences of wage disparities on team performance.
6League quality is now de￿ned as:
q(x1;::;xn) = ￿T(x1;::;xn) + (1 ￿ ￿)CB(x1;::;xn): (4)
The parameter ￿ 2 (0;1) represents the relative weight that fans place on ag-
gregate talent and competitive balance. Given aggregate salaries
Pn
j=1;j6=i xj of
the other (n ￿ 1) clubs, league quality increases with club i￿ s salary payment xi
until a threshold value x0
i(￿), i.e.,
@q
@xi > 0 , xi < x0
i(￿). Since fans have at least
some preference for competitive balance, excessive dominance by one club causes
quality to decrease.
League revenues are split between the two types of clubs according to the
bargaining power of the clubs. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that half
of the clubs have strong bargaining power, ml, and half of them have weak
bargaining power, ms. Each of the large clubs receives a fraction
ml
n=2 of league
revenues, and each of the small clubs receives a fraction ms
n=2 of league revenues,
with
ml > ms and ml + ms = 1:
We denote Jl and Js as the set of large-market and small-market clubs, respec-
tively, i.e., J = f1;::;ng = Jl [ Js.
Furthermore, our league features a luxury tax system with an endogenously-
determined luxury tax and subsidy.6 A club must pay a luxury tax if its salary
payment lies above the league￿ s average salary level. The club with a salary pay-
ment below the league￿ s average salary level then receives this tax as a subsidy.
We model the endogenously determined tax or subsidy, ￿i(x1;::;xn), as follows










6See also Marburger (1997).
7where the parameter r 2 [0;1] represents the tax rate. Note that if club i spends
more than the league￿ s average salary level, then this club has to pay a luxury
tax, whereas it receives a subsidy if it spends less than the average level in the
league, i.e., ￿i > 0 , xi < 1
n
Pn
j=1 xj. Moreover, note that
Pn
i=1 ￿i = 0: that is,
the luxury tax or subsidy involves a pure redistribution among clubs.






































with ￿ = l for i 2 Jl and ￿ = s for i 2 Js.
Social welfare is given by the sum of the aggregate consumer (or fan) surplus,
the aggregate club pro￿t and the aggregate player salaries. Aggregate consumer
surplus, CS, corresponds to the integral of the demand function, d(p;q), from
the equilibrium price p￿ =
q
2 to the maximum price p = q, which is the maximum














Summing up aggregate consumer surplus, aggregate club pro￿ts and aggregate





Note that neither salary payments, taxes nor subsidies directly in￿ uence social
8welfare, because salaries merely represent a transfer from clubs to players, and
the tax or subsidy involves a pure redistribution among clubs.
As mentioned above, clubs are assumed to be pro￿t-maximizing and thus,




The solution to the maximization problem is given in the next lemma:
Lemma 1 test






















s 8j 2 Js;
(8)
with v1 := ms(r(n ￿ 1) + n), v2 := ml(r(n ￿ 1) ￿ n) and w1 = 1 ￿ ￿(n2 + 1),
w2 = 1 + ￿(n2 ￿ 1).
Proof. See the Appendix.
The lemma shows that all large (small) clubs choose the same salary level,
xl (xs). Moreover, the large clubs spend more on player salaries than the small
clubs because the marginal revenue of talent investments is higher for the former
type of clubs. As a consequence, each large club has to pay a luxury tax, and
each small club receives a subsidy, which is ￿nanced by the large clubs.




@r > 0. This result is intuitively clear: a higher tax rate
increases the subsidies to small clubs, which are ￿nanced by large clubs, such
that the investment costs of small clubs decrease. The e⁄ect of a higher tax rate
7For a discussion of the club objective function, see e.g., Sloane (1971), Hoehn and Szy-
manski (1999), Fort and Quirk (2004), KØsenne (2000b, 2007), Dietl, Lang and Werner (2009).
9on the talent investments of large clubs, however, is ambiguous and depends on





(n ￿ 1)(ms ￿ ml + ￿(ml ￿ ms + n2)
2mlms(1 ￿ ￿)￿
8
> > > > <
> > > > :







= 0 if ￿ =
ml￿ms
ml￿ms+n2;






A higher tax rate induces large clubs to increase their investment level if fans have
a high preference for competitive balance, i.e., ￿ <
ml￿ms
ml￿ms+n2, and to decrease
their investment level if fans have a high preference for aggregate talent, i.e.,
￿ >
ml￿ms
ml￿ms+n2. The rationale for this result is as follows. If ￿ is relatively small,
the equilibrium (8) is characterized by a high level of competitive balance and a
low level of aggregate talent. At these equilibrium levels, the marginal bene￿t of
a higher level of aggregate talent, which translates into higher revenues, is larger
than the higher investment costs due to a higher tax. As a consequence, large
clubs will increase their investment level.
In contrast, if ￿ is relatively high, the equilibrium is already characterized by
a high level of aggregate talent. In this case, the marginal bene￿t of a higher
level of aggregate talent is small, and the higher investments costs compensate
for the higher revenues.
On aggregate, however, the investment level always increases with a higher
tax rate. That is, even if large clubs decrease their investments (i.e., if ￿ >
ml￿ms
ml￿ms+n2), they never compensate for the increase of talent among small clubs.
The luxury tax paid by each large club, i 2 Jl, in equilibrium is given by
￿l = ￿
rn((ml ￿ ms)n ￿ (n ￿ 1)r)
2msml(1 ￿ ￿)
< 0:
10Meanwhile the subsidy received by each small club, j 2 Js, is given by
￿s =
rn((ml ￿ ms)n ￿ (n ￿ 1)r)
2msml(1 ￿ ￿)
> 0:
Note that a higher tax rate, r, increases the subsidy ￿s received by small clubs
and decreases the luxury tax, ￿l, paid by large clubs until the maximum and
minimum, respectively, is reached for r = b r :=
n(ml￿ms)
2(n￿1) .
In equilibrium, the aggregate level of salary payments, S￿(r), and competitive




















We thus derive the following proposition.
Proposition 1 test
A higher tax rate increases the level of competition and produces a more balanced
league.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Remember that on aggregate, the investment level increases with a higher
tax rate: that is, the net e⁄ect of a higher tax rate is positive, and aggregate
player salaries in the league will increase, i.e.,
@S￿(r)
@r > 0. It follows that a higher
level of aggregate salary payments in the league translates through the talent
function (2) into a higher level of the competition, T.
The proposition further shows that a higher tax rate produces a more bal-
anced league and, thus, increases competitive balance, i.e.,
@CB￿(r)
@r > 0. The
rationale for this result is that a higher tax diminishes di⁄erences among clubs.
11That is, even if large clubs increase their investment levels, small clubs will always







Since both the level of the competition, T, and competitive balance, CB,
increase through a higher tax rate, it is clear that league quality, as given by
q = ￿T + (1 ￿ ￿)CB, will also increase. A higher league quality will then result
in higher league revenues, LR.
As a consequence, we are able to establish the following proposition:
Proposition 2 test
A higher tax rate increases social welfare in a team sports league comprised of
pro￿t-maximizing clubs.
Proof. Straightforward.
The proposition posits that the introduction of a luxury tax system that
redistributes revenues from large-market clubs to small-market clubs increases
social welfare in a team sports league comprised of pro￿t-maximizing clubs. Since
a higher tax rate increases league quality, it will also increase social welfare
because welfare is directly proportional to league quality. Note that the result of
the proposition is independent of the fans￿preferences for aggregate talent and
competitive balance.
In the following proposition, we analyze the e⁄ect of a higher tax rate on club
pro￿ts.
Proposition 3 test
A higher tax rate always increases the pro￿ts of large clubs, whereas the pro￿ts
of small clubs only increase until the pro￿t maximum is reached for a tax rate
given by r = r￿ 2 (0;1].
Proof. See the Appendix.
12This proposition posits that even though large clubs must subsidize small
clubs, the large clubs always bene￿t from a higher tax, whereas the small clubs
only bene￿t up to a certain tax level, r￿. The rationale for this result is as follows.
On the revenue side, both clubs bene￿t from higher league revenues as a result
of a higher luxury tax. Large clubs, however, bene￿t from the higher league
revenues at an above-average rate because they receive a larger share of league
revenues. On the cost side, small clubs face higher investment costs due to higher
salary payments, while the investment costs for large clubs decrease (increase) if
fans have a high preference for aggregate talent (competitive balance). For small
clubs, the higher subsidies and higher revenues compensate for the higher salary
payments only until the tax rate reaches r￿. For large clubs, however, the higher
revenues always compensate for the higher costs, and thus, pro￿ts increase with
a higher tax rate.
3 Conclusion
Luxury taxes are an important way to increase competitive balance in profes-
sional sports leagues. In this paper, we analyze the e⁄ects of a luxury tax on
competitive balance, club pro￿ts, and social welfare under the assumption that
clubs maximize pro￿ts. We develop a game-theoretic model of an n-club league
consisting of small-market and large-market clubs and derive fan demand from a
general utility function by assuming that a fan￿ s willingness to pay depends on the
quality of the league. Our league features the combination of an endogenously-
determined luxury tax and subsidy. Clubs with payroll exceeding the average
salary level must pay a luxury tax on the excess amount. These proceeds are
then redistributed proportionally to those clubs with a payroll below the league
average.
Our analysis shows that a higher luxury tax induces small clubs to increase
13their salary payments. If fans have a high preference for aggregate talent, how-
ever, large clubs will respond by decreasing their salary payments. Aggregate
payrolls will increase with a higher tax rate, as the increase in salary payments by
small clubs is always larger than the decrease in salary payments by large clubs.
As a consequence, both competitive balance and total salary payments will in-
crease. The e⁄ect of luxury taxes on social welfare is positive, because league
quality will always increase as a result of the combination of luxury taxes and
its resulting subsidies. Finally, our model shows that a luxury tax will increase
the pro￿ts of large-market clubs, whereas the pro￿ts of small-market clubs only
increase if the tax rate is not set inadequately high. This result holds despite the
fact that large-market clubs must ￿nance the subsidies for small-market clubs.
Further research is necessary, for example, to model the bargaining game
among clubs and league authorities in the distribution of league revenues. More-
over, luxury taxes have not yet been analyzed in the context of so-called mixed
leagues, that is, in leagues in which some clubs maximize pro￿ts, while others
aim to maximize wins.
14A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
















































































j. Note that ￿ = l for i 2 Jl and ￿ = s for i 2 Js. Solving























s 8j 2 Js;
with v1 := ms(r(n ￿ 1) + n), v2 := ml(r(n ￿ 1) ￿ n) and w1 = 1 ￿ ￿(n2 + 1),
w2 = 1 + ￿(n2 ￿ 1).
In order to guarantee positive equilibrium investments, we assume that ￿ is
su¢ ciently large. Moreover, in order to guarantee that large clubs always invest
more than small clubs, we assume that ml > b m := ms
n+(n￿1)r
n(1￿r)+r.
8It is easy to show that the corresponding second-order conditions for a maximum are
satis￿ed.
15A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
First, we prove that a higher tax rate increases the level of competition. Substi-
tuting the equilibrium talent investments (8) in the talent function, T, given by








@r > 0 for all n > 2, 1 > ml > ms > 0, 1 > r > 0 and
1 > ￿ > 0.





n2(n ￿ 1)(mln + r ￿ n(ms + r))
2(mlms(1 ￿ ￿))2
Since ml > b m, it holds that
@CB￿(r)
@r > 0, which completes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
In order to analyze the e⁄ect of a luxury tax on club pro￿ts, we consider a
two-club league with n = 2 and set the fan preference parameter to ￿ = 1=2.9
Substituting the equilibrium talent investments (8) into the pro￿t function (6)
and maximizing it with respect to the tax rate, r, yields the following pro￿t-




10ml ￿ 10ms(ml + 1) + 26m2
s
4 + m2
l ￿ 2ms(ml + 8) + m2
s
;





2ml(5 + 3ml) ￿ 2ms(11ml + 5)
4 + m2
l ￿ 2ml(ms ￿ 8) + m2
s
:
9This parameterization allows us to derive closed-form solutions. The results remain qual-
itatively the same for other parameter con￿gurations.
16We can show that r￿
l ￿ 2, i.e. that the maximum pro￿t for large clubs is not
within the interval of feasible tax rates. As a consequence, pro￿ts for large clubs
increase for all r 2 [0;1]. In contrast, for small clubs, the pro￿t-maximizing tax
rate, r￿
s = r￿, is in the interval (0;1]. It follows that the pro￿ts of small clubs
increase when r < r￿ and decrease when r > r￿. This completes the proof.
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